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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-3662 
______________ 
 
BEVERLY LAMBERSON, Administratrix of the Estate of  
Melinda Lamberson Reynolds, Deceased, 
       Appellant  
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE; PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL 
AFFAIRS; PENNSYLVANIA DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL HEALTH 
MONORITING PROGRAMS; PENNSYLVANIA STATE BOARD OF NURSING; 
BASIL L. MERENDA; LINDA TANZINI AMBROSO; K. STEPHEN ANDERSON; 
CHRISTOPHER BARTLETT; RAFAELA COLON;  KATHLEEN M. DWYER; JUDY 
A. HALE; SUZANNE M. HENDRICKS; JOSEPH J. NAPOLITANO; ANN L. 
O'SULLIVAN; JANET H. SHIELDS; JOANNE L. SORENSEN; PAULET E. 
WASHINGTON 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 3-09-cv-01492) 
District Judge: Hon. James M. Munley 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
*
                                                 
*
 The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern 
District of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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(Filed:  March 28, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Beverly Lamberson, as administratrix of the estate of Melinda Lamberson 
Reynolds,
1
 appeals the denial of her motion for partial summary judgment and the grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
Pennsylvania Department of State (“DoS”), Pennsylvania Bureau of Professional and 
Occupational Affairs (“BPOA”), Pennsylvania Division of Professional Health 
Monitoring Programs (“PHMP”), Pennsylvania State Board of Nursing (“BoN”), and 
various state officials.
2
  Plaintiff argues that Defendants suspended Reynolds’s nursing 
license in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the 
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”).  Because there is no dispute that Reynolds was not in 
compliance with any of the BoN directives, we will affirm. 
I.  
As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Reynolds was a licensed practical nurse and registered 
                                                 
1
 Reynolds initiated this action, but passed away during its pendency.  Beverly 
Lamberson was subsequently substituted as Plaintiff.   
2
 The state officials include the commissioner of the BPOA and members of the 
BoN. 
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nurse in Pennsylvania for over fifteen years.  Reynolds suffered from substance abuse 
problems, particularly with opioid drugs, and starting in 1997, she began receiving 
methadone maintenance treatment for her opioid addiction.
3
   
In February 2005, DoS, which administers professional licensing in Pennsylvania,
4
 
received a complaint from Reynolds’s then employer that Reynolds was acting “erratic” 
at work, her charting was “illegible, incorrect or missing all together,” and she tested 
positive for benzodiazepines.  App. 817.  DoS forwarded the complaint to PHMP, which 
assists licensed professionals who suffer from impairments, such as chemical 
dependency, to obtain treatment and monitoring to ensure that they can safely practice 
their licensed professions.    
On March 1, 2005, Pearl Harris, a case manager at PHMP, sent Reynolds a letter 
informing her that she could enroll in PHMP’s Voluntary Recovery Program (“VRP”) 
and receive treatment without the need for action by the BoN.  Reynolds expressed 
interest in enrolling in the program and took the first step by undergoing an assessment at 
A Better Today, a PHMP-approved alcohol and drug treatment facility, on June 14, 2005.  
A Better Today deemed outpatient treatment appropriate.  From June 14, 2005 to 
September 1, 2005, Reynolds, however, attended only six of sixteen scheduled treatment 
                                                 
3
 Methadone is a legal synthetic opioid drug that is used to treat opioid dependence 
by controlling withdrawal symptoms and helping opioid-dependent patients refrain from 
drug use.   
4
 DoS consists of a number of agencies, including the BPOA, PHMP, and BoN, 
that regulate licensed professionals. 
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sessions.  Reynolds ultimately failed to meet her treatment attendance requirements, and, 
in November 2005, A Better Today informed PHMP that she had been discharged due to 
this non-compliance.   
Harris closed Reynolds’s VRP file and forwarded it to the BPOA for review and 
the initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings.  The BoN ordered that Reynolds be 
evaluated by a nationally respected addiction specialist who ultimately issued an August 
30, 2006 report concluding that Reynolds “is able to practice nursing with the requisite 
skill and safety provided she is monitored for a time to be determined by the Board.”  
App. 380 (emphasis in original).  On October 5, 2006, the BPOA filed an order directing 
Reynolds to show cause why her license should not be suspended, revoked, or otherwise 
restricted in light of the fact that she was not being monitored as the addiction specialist 
deemed necessary.   
Instead of answering the order to show cause, Reynolds entered into a Consent 
Agreement, approved by the BoN on January 7, 2007, under which Reynolds was 
permitted to continue to practice on a probationary status provided that she: (1) forward 
to PHMP a copy of an initial evaluation and subsequent treatment reports by a PHMP-
approved provider; (2) obtain written verification of support-group attendance; (3) submit 
to random drug tests as directed by PHMP; and (4) pay all costs incurred in complying 
with the Consent Agreement.   
Harris referred Reynolds back to A Better Today, and she was evaluated on 
 5 
 
January 15, 2007.  A Better Today informed Harris that Reynolds was opioid and 
benzodiazepine dependent, and that, although Reynolds was directed and agreed to enter 
into an inpatient methadone detox program before being admitted to outpatient therapy,
5
 
Reynolds “failed to follow through and made repeated calls to A Better Today in which 
she sounded impaired,” App. 412, and A Better Today “discontinued the unsuccessful 
clinical process” on January 31, 2007.  Id.   
On March 5, 2007, Harris sent Reynolds a letter notifying Reynolds of her non-
compliance with the Consent Agreement due to her failure to: (1) provide releases for 
information and other materials related to her evaluation and treatment; (2) set up and 
provide random drug screens; (3) provide support group verification sheets since entering 
the program in January 2007; and (4) ensure that written reports were sent to PHMP by 
her employer and treatment providers.  On April 24, 2007, Harris reported these 
violations to the DoS Prosecution Division and informed Reynolds of that report.  The 
DoS Prosecution Division thereafter submitted a petition to the Probable Cause Screening 
Committee of the BoN, which issued a preliminary order suspending Reynolds’s license.   
Reynolds filed an answer, and on July 11, 2007, a BoN hearing examiner held a 
hearing.  The parties stipulated that Reynolds violated the Consent Agreement, and 
Reynolds used the hearing as an opportunity to present mitigating evidence in an attempt 
                                                 
5
 The particular rapid detoxification program A Better Today recommended was 
viewed, even by Defendants’ expert, as inappropriate for a patient on methadone 
maintenance treatment, as it would be “extremely uncomfortable for the patient and could 
result in significant medical complications.”  App. 168. 
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to preserve her license, testifying that her husband had recently passed away and that, 
because of financial difficulty, she was unable to pay the costs of the drug screening.  
Reynolds further stated that she disagreed with the conclusion that she was required to 
wean off methadone in order to safely practice and that such a detox would be very 
difficult for her, but that she would be committed to being detoxed from methadone if she 
had no other choice in order to keep her license.
6
   
On August 10, 2007, the BoN hearing examiner issued a decision and proposed 
order, finding that Reynolds violated the Consent Agreement because she had (1) failed 
to enroll in the random drug-screening program; (2) failed to submit monthly verification 
that she was attending support-group meetings; and (3) failed to comply with the 
treatment recommendation that she enter inpatient treatment in order to be weaned from 
methadone.  The examiner ordered that Reynolds’s license be suspended for three years, 
with the opportunity to stay the suspension and reinstate her license once Reynolds 
                                                 
6
 At that time, PHMP had a policy stating that  
 
any licensee assessed by a PHMP-approved provider . . . in need of ongoing 
methadone maintenance will be declared ineligible to participate in the 
PHMP.  Such licensees will be referred to the Board, with the 
recommendation that the Board consider any individual requiring 
maintenance on methadone as unfit to practice. . . . Once effectively 
withdrawn from methadone dependence, the licensee may not reenter a 
program of ongoing methadone maintenance unless referred by the PHMP-
approved provider. 
 
App. 381 (emphasis in original).  As discussed infra, this policy was changed less than 
one year later. 
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“provides the Board with an evaluation from a PHMP approved treatment provider that 
she is safe to practice nursing.”  App. 458.   
Neither party filed exceptions to the hearing examiner’s proposed order, and the 
BoN adopted it as its final order on September 18, 2007.  No appeal was taken from the 
order.  Harris reopened Reynolds’s file following the final order, and in November 2007, 
Harris directed Reynolds once more to seek an evaluation and treatment from A Better 
Today.  There is no evidence that Reynolds contacted A Better Today or had any further 
interaction with this provider. 
In February 2008, Dr. William Santoro, an addiction medicine specialist who 
treated Reynolds at New Directions Treatment Services, her methadone maintenance 
provider, contacted A Better Today to discuss Reynolds’s treatment and express concern 
about the recommendation that Reynolds be rapidly withdrawn from methadone.  After 
speaking with A Better Today, Dr. Santoro wrote a letter to Harris expressing his concern 
that A Better Today was biased against treating addictions with medication such as 
methadone.  Dr. Santoro requested that Reynolds be sent to another program that would 
consider all scientifically proven methods of treatment.  Harris never responded to that 
letter.   
On March 5, 2008, Harris sent Reynolds a letter explaining that, in response to a 
message from Reynolds, she was trying to contact her, but Reynolds’s phone had a block 
in place.  She therefore requested that Reynolds call PHMP.  Having received no call, and 
 8 
 
hence no opportunity to discuss Dr. Santoro’s letter with her, and in light of Reynolds’s 
apparent noncompliance with the treatment program, on March 13, 2008, Harris sent a 
letter to Reynolds informing her that her PHMP file had been closed, and that in order to 
reopen the file, A Better Today had to send PHMP a statement “indicating that you have 
fully and completely complied and cooperated with recommendations to enter inpatient 
treatment to be weaned from methadone.”  App. 416.   
In April 2008, Glen Cooper, the executive director of New Directions Treatment 
Services, contacted Defendants on behalf of Reynolds to raise concerns regarding 
PHMP’s policy that requires a nurse to be abstinent from methadone before the nurse will 
be permitted to return to the practice of nursing.  Defendants met with Cooper on May 5, 
2008, to discuss changing their methadone policy, and in June 2008, PHMP revised the 
policy to remove the blanket prohibition on methadone use by licensees and provide an 
individual determination of fitness to practice for those on methadone maintenance 
treatment.  Defendants advised Cooper and Dr. Santoro of this change.  There is no 
evidence that Reynolds contacted PHMP after this date to take advantage of the new 
policy. 
Reynolds filed a Complaint against Defendants on August 4, 2009, amending it in 
November 2009.  The Amended Complaint seeks a declaration that Defendants’ policy of 
excluding nurses who are in a methadone maintenance program from licensing violates 
Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and Section 504 of the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as 
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well as injunctive relief and damages.   
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part with respect to the 
claims for damages against the individual defendants,
7
 but was denied as to Defendants’ 
request that the District Court abstain from deciding the case on Younger
8
 abstention 
grounds.  The District Court also denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration or to 
certify for interlocutory appeal.   
After discovery, Plaintiff and Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment: 
Plaintiff for partial summary judgment that the methadone policy was illegal under the 
ADA and RA, and Defendants for summary judgment in their favor on all claims.  The 
District Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s 
motion.  This appeal followed.   
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment.9  Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy 
                                                 
7
 On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge the ruling relating to the liability of the 
individual defendants for damages.  Moreover, Reynolds’s death rendered her request for 
injunctive relief moot.  See James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2008). 
8
 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
9
 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s summary judgment ruling 
only.  We do not address Defendants’ argument that the District Court erred by not 
abstaining from hearing this case under the Younger abstention doctrine, as “[i]t is 
axiomatic that any party contesting an unfavorable order or judgment below must file an 
appeal,” EF Operating Corp. v. American Buildings, 993 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1993), 
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Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
 In reaching this decision, the Court must determine “whether the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is therefore entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, L.L.C., 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).  A disputed issue 
is “genuine” only “if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury 
could find for the non-moving party.”  Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  A factual 
dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.  
Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Gray v. York 
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992)).  The Court’s task is not to 
resolve disputed issues of fact, but to determine whether there exist any factual issues to 
be tried.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49.  “In making this determination, we must 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Defendants here failed to file a cross-appeal in order to challenge the District Court’s 
denial of its motion to dismiss.  A grant of summary judgment and a dismissal due to 
abstention are “wholly different forms of relief”—indeed, the Defendants’ dismissal 
argument “seeks to vacate the summary judgment”—and Defendants are required to file a 
cross-appeal in order to seek such relief.  Id. at 1049. 
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consider the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 
Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 264 F.3d at 369 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).   
III.  
 Because essentially the same standards govern both the ADA and RA claims, the 
Court may simultaneously address both claims.  McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 
95 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Whether suit is filed under the [RA] or under the [ADA], the 
substantive standards for determining liability are the same.” (citation omitted)).  To 
prevail on a violation of either of those statutes,
10
 Plaintiff must demonstrate that 
Reynolds: (1) had a disability as defined under the statute;
11
 (2) was otherwise qualified 
to hold a nursing license; and (3) by reason of such disability, was excluded from 
retaining her nursing license.
12
  See Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. 
Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009). 
                                                 
10
 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any such entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
Section 504 of the RA provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”  
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
11
 Drug addiction is included within the meaning of disability under both the ADA 
and the RA where the impairment is not due to the “current illegal use of drugs.”  28 
C.F.R. § 35.104(5)(iii).   
12
 Title II of the ADA only applies to discrimination by a “public entity,” which is 
defined as “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of 
 12 
 
 As we explained in C.G. v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, 734 F.3d 229, 
235 (3d Cir. 2013), one of the only differences between claims under the ADA and the 
RA is their standards for causation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“by reason of such 
disability”); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“solely by reason of her or his disability”).  “The RA 
allows a plaintiff to recover if he or she were deprived of an opportunity to participate in 
a program solely on the basis of disability, while the ADA covers discrimination on the 
basis of disability, even if there is another cause as well.”  C.G., 734 F.3d at 235-36.  
Thus, while a disability must be the “sole cause” of the alleged discrimination under the 
RA, a plaintiff may succeed under the ADA “so long as disability ‘. . . had a  
determinative effect on the outcome,’” and thus was the “but for” cause of the adverse 
action.  Id. at 236 n.11 (quoting New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 
F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007)).   
 Here, the District Court correctly applied the “but for” causation standard and 
found that while Reynolds’s failure to be weaned off methadone was one of the reasons 
she was found not to be in compliance with her Consent Agreement, there were two other 
violations of the Consent Agreement—failure to enroll in the random drug-screening 
program and failure to submit monthly verification that she was attending support-group 
                                                                                                                                                             
a State . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B).  No party disputes that Defendants are all “public 
entit[ies].” 
The RA requires the additional showing that the program receives federal financial 
assistance.  29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  No party disputes that DoS receives federal financial 
assistance and the other Defendants are part of DoS.   
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meetings—which would in and of themselves be sufficient for a suspension.  Reynolds 
stipulated to these violations in her proceeding before the BoN, and the hearing examiner 
identified them as the reason for suspension.  Thus, PHMP’s methadone policy was not a 
“but for” factor in the decision to suspend Reynolds’s license or why it was not 
reinstated. 
 Plaintiff argues that the District Court wrongly narrowed its review to the BoN 
order suspending Reynolds’s license and ignored the fact that PHMP’s methadone policy 
prohibited her from being able to get that license back because the BoN required 
Reynolds to be monitored by PHMP and provide an evaluation from a PHMP-approved 
treatment provider in order to stay the suspension.  Even if the District Court did not 
consider that argument, there is no evidence that Reynolds did anything to comply with 
the BoN order after it became final in September 2007.  There is no record of Reynolds 
contacting A Better Today and attempting to fulfill even part of their program.  Likewise, 
there is no evidence showing Reynolds attempted to re-open her file with PHMP after the 
June 2008 policy change, despite the fact that her New Directions care providers were 
made aware of it.  Plaintiff is therefore unable to show that it was PHMP’s methadone 
 14 
 
policy,
13
 and not Reynolds’s own inaction, that prevented her from regaining her 
license.
14
 
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants and the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. 
                                                 
13
 The District Court did not make any ruling on whether PHMP’s methadone 
policy violated the ADA and/or the RA, and we likewise do not reach that issue.  
14
 For the same reasons, the methadone detoxification requirement was not the sole 
reason her license was suspended.   
 
